My Piece on the Cultural Heritage Movement and Environmental Justice

A typical row house in Houston's 4th Ward, from 1984. Via FPH.

I've just received the final proof of an article I've written where I try to trace the connections between material culture and the environment: Justice and the Cultural Heritage Movement: Using Environmental Justice to Appraise Art and Antiquities Disputes, 20 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 43 (2012).

In the piece I look to some of the writing being done on environmental justice and I think about what lessons we can take as cultural heritage advocates. I examine disputes ranging from looting of antiquities sites to the lack of preservation of certain areas here in Houston like Freedmen's town.

Here's a short video segment interviewing an advocate for Houston's Fourth Ward:




It's a theoretical piece. One which I'll freely admit is partly aspirational. But one that I'm proud of. As always I'd welcome any feedback. Here's the abstract:

What does justice require? This paper aims to spark a conversation about the role of justice in art and antiquities disputes by introducing the concept of cultural justice. Borrowing from a principle known as environmental justice, cultural justice allows the application of critical scrutiny to the law and norms that govern cultural heritage. The history of environmental justice—including both its successes and failures—offers important lessons for the cultural heritage movement. Environmental and cultural injustice plagues the same nations and groups: Africa, Central and South America, and indigenous groups are denied the same environmental and cultural benefits. The cultural heritage movement has been subject to the same criticisms as the environmental justice movement, but has not had the benefit of an animating theoretical framework. The law strains to resolve art and antiquities disputes. Examining disputes through the lens of cultural justice allows us to move beyond thinking about art in terms of keeping it in museums (or the art trade) or returning it to its nation of origin. This paper applies Rawls’s theory of justice to cultural heritage and presents a taxonomy of cultural justice, examining in detail its distributive, procedural, corrective, and social aspects. Thinking about cultural justice allows a deeper understanding of the reasons why cultural heritage disputes are so difficult to resolve. By considering cultural justice, we can also begin to define the limits of what law and policy can do to remedy historical and contemporary art taking. These limits have eluded cultural heritage advocates, subjecting the cultural heritage movement to broad criticisms.

As always, I am very happy to post any link or abstract to anyone's writing in the cultural heritage field, whether it's a work in progress or has been published. Just drop me a comment below, or email me at derek.fincham 'at' gmail.com.

Justice and the Cultural Heritage Movement: Using Environmental Justice to Appraise Art and Antiquities Disputes, 20 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 43 (2012).

Shearing on Australia's Heritage Law Framework

Susan Shearing, a Lecturer at the Australian Centre for Climate and Environmental Law at the University of Sydney has authored "Reforming Australia's National Heritage Law Framework" in Volume 8(2) of the Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law (2012). (PDF) From the abstract:

It is argued that while some useful initiatives have been adopted in response to the review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the overall response of the Government has been disappointing, focusing on refining procedural frameworks to facilitate a streamlined approach to heritage assessment and approvals rather than substantive reform to the EPBC Act. Further, there has been limited progress in reforming national laws dealing with indigenous heritage, movable heritage and historic shipwrecks.

Tushnet on Images in Design Patents

The 1937 design patent for the coke bottle

Rebecca Tushnet of Georgetown Law has an essay titled: "The Eye Alone is the Judge: Images and Design patents", 19 J. Intell. Prop. L. 409 (2012).

Design patents are an area of intellectual property law focused entirely on the visual, unlike copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, or the various sui generis protections that have occasionally been enacted for specific types of innovation. Judges and lawyers in general are highly uncomfortable with images, yet design patents force direct legal engagement with images. This short piece offers an outsider’s view of what design patent law has to say about the use of images as legal tools, why tests for design patent infringement are likely to stay unsatisfactory, and what lessons other fields of intellectual property, specifically copyright, might take from design patent.

Miller on "The Visual and the Law of Cities"

Stephen Miller, of the University of Idaho College of Law has posted "The Visual and the Law of Cities", forthcoming in the Pace Law Review, on SSRN. From the abstract:

This experimental article will attempt to explore, through brief sketches, or “tableaus,” four ways in which the visual interplays with the law of cities, and how a deeper understanding of this intersection can assist in the development of these laws and their underlying policies. For the purposes of this article, the “law of cities” is defined as those allied fields of law that deal with building, construction, architecture, planning, developing, preserving, and otherwise creating the places where we live. First, the article explores the law’s longstanding adverse relationship to the visual, as well as contemporary efforts to change that relationship. The article then turns to the four tableaus that explore the law of cities and the visual. In the first tableau, the article discusses the question of the cultural value of a hand-drawn map by reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court’s nineteenth century jurisprudence on Spanish era diseños, or property maps, which were part of Spanish and Mexican California-era land grants. In the second tableau, the article discusses the question of whether aesthetics is a proper domain of the law of cities by comparing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berman v. Parker, its progeny, and Daniel Burnham’s 1909 Plan of Chicago, which was the first, and perhaps most important, comprehensive plan drafted for an American city in the “City Beautiful” tradition. The third tableau explores the production of space and the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre in the context of the visual as law, most notably, in the rise of visual zoning codes. The fourth tableau extends the law and literature movement to the visual arts through the philosophy of Edward Casey as applied to the painter Edward Hopper. By presenting these four approaches in which the visual complicates and assists the law of cities, and sometimes even acts as the law of cities, the article intends to spur a dialogue on the complicated relationship of the visual to the law of cities.

Student Note Examining Bakalar v. Vavra and choice of law in New York

Egon Schiele, Seated Woman With Bent Left Leg (Torso)

The June issue of the Columbia Law Review has an interesting student note by Laurie Frey, Bakalar v. Vavra and the Art of Conflicts Analysis in New York: Framing a Choice of Law Approach for Moveable Property, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1055 (2012). The case involves this 1917 gouache and crayon work which passed through an Austirian shipping company during the holocaust era.

From the introduction:

The facts of Bakalar v. Vavra presented a familiar scenario in Holocaust-era art cases. A good faith purchaser, who thought he had bought clear title to a drawing, went to sell the drawing at auction in New York and found himself confronted by the claims of alleged heirs, who asserted that the painting was taken from their ancestor by the Nazis. Typical of art cases, the drawing had passed through a number of jurisdictions before arriving in New York, and the court in Bakalar faced the difficult question of what jurisdiction's laws to apply to determine which of the parties had title to the drawing. This Note examines the particular importance of choosing the law to apply in disputes between good faith purchasers of artworks and the artworks' original owners, or their heirs—disputes in which the law chosen may lead to dramatically different results. The Note then reviews the evolution of the analysis for choice of law generally and in New York particularly. Prior to Bakalar, the law in New York appeared to be a combination of an interest analysis and the more traditional lex situs approach, which focused on the location where a particular transaction took place. This Note argues that the Second Circuit misconstrued prior New York case law in its application of the interest analysis without regard to the lex situs. The Second Circuit's analysis created uncertainty and unpredictability in New York choice of law rules, and New York needs a revised choice of law rule for property conflicts that gives both predictability and nuance to the law post-Bakalar. This Note proposes a return to an interest analysis that places particular emphasis on the location of the property transfer at issue in the case. Such a rule would lead to more predictable results, since the law of the transaction location would typically apply, but it would also give judges discretion to weigh other relevant factors.

Student Note on the Visual Artists Rights Act

A part of the installation under dispute between Mass. MoCA and Christopher Buchel 

Elizabeth M. Bock has a student note in  the Michigan Law Review on the Visual Artists Rights Act. From the Introduction:

In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted the novel question of when moral rights protections vest under the Visual Artists Rights Act. In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel, the First Circuit determined that the protections of the Visual Artists Rights Act begin when a work is “created” under the Copyright Act. This Note argues that this decision harms moral rights conceptually and is likely to result in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions. This Note proposes instead that these statutory protections should vest when an artist determines that his work is complete and presents it to the public. This standard is more consistent with the history of moral rights. Additionally, public access is necessary to justify a treatment of art different from that of other types of property, and it is a more essential component of moral rights than an artist’s feelings of connection to his work. Finally, the legislative intent behind the Visual Artists Rights Act and the reasoning in previous judicial decisions are more accurately reflected by a public disclosure standard. Utilizing “creation” as a vesting point for moral rights is not supported by the history of the Visual Artists Rights Act and will result in uncertainty and inconsistency in future decisions.